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Conclusion:
Are Nietzsche and Strindberg Our Contemporaries? 
As we leave Axel Borg, he sails for the horizon, and several questions 
remain: are we still living in an era where we are forced to choose be-
tween sailing towards the open sea and clinging tremulously to the shore-
line? Are the tides still governed by the fractious twins, Prometheus and 
Christ? Are we still subjected to the collisions between internalized dis-
courses of secular expansionism and a promise of salvation that awaits us 
only upon the event of our demise? As we enter the third millennium, do 
the contested aspects of nineteenth century modernists still speak to our 
condition? Are we still living in »die Zeit der Tragödie, die Zeit der 
Moralen und Religionen« (the age of tragedy, the age of moralities and 
religion) as Nietzsche put it?1 Is there any alternative? 
 Despite the theoretical battles of the late twentieth century, with the 
subsequent disputes over definition and forms of dissemination, I am 
inclined to postulate that the tragic condition of subjectivity, the collision 
between secular and religious discourse under the sign of nihilism’s weak 
truth claim still speaks to our conditions of possibility. Therefore the 
purpose of this conclusion is twofold: to test the hypothesis that the ge-
nealogy of self as a process of subject formation that applies to both a 
religious and a secular perspective, and to discuss the contemporaneity of 
the concept for us. 
 I will conduct this test through a reading of two »autobiographical« 
texts: Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo and Strindberg’s Inferno (1897). The com-
monality of the formal aspects of the genealogy are severely put to the test 
in this analysis, as Inferno is a text depicting a religious awakening and 
Ecce Homo is known for its atheistic conclusion. More importantly for 
this study, I will demonstrate how the absent father, the dead father’s 
position is colonized by Nietzsche and how sacred narrative conflates 
with family drama in Strindberg’s late drama, Till Damaskus 1. It is my 
contention that the subject, who oscillates between tragedy and parody, 
that is between inescapable risk and the safety of the already written, 
between the new and the familiar, is an aspect of the bourgeois uncanny
————
1  NIETZSCHE: 1988c, KSA 3, 370, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. The English translation 
is from NAUCKHOFF and DEL CARO: 2001, 28.
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found in both writer’s work.2 In addition, my understanding of the con-
temporaneity of the genealogy of self will be informed by a reading of the 
Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo. Vattimo’s work emphasizes an as-
pect of a contemporary resonance of Nietzschean thought, namely the 
weakening of the truth claim of an interpretive act. His discussion of 
hermeneutics is our point of entry. 
Hermeneutics, »The Fabling of Being,« 
and »The Death of God« 
The title of this conclusion asks the question: Are Strindberg and 
Nietzsche our contemporaries? While the title in question is broadly 
formulated and runs the risk of initiating an excursion into a circular 
argument, the potential circularity inherent in its formulation is purpose-
ful. For the question of the contemporary relevance of nineteenth-century 
letters has been a circular process for twentieth century scholars. In other 
words, it has been a hermeneutic question. I employ the term hermeneu-
tics in the sense that Vattimo defines the term in Beyond Interpretation: 
The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy.3 His main argument rests 
upon the claim that the commonality found in late twentieth-Century 
philosophical thought can be found in the dominance of hermeneutics 
and the subsequent weakening of any claim to truth. True to form, Vat-
timo defines hermeneutics in a weak sense himself, as the family resem-
blance of a wide variety of theories, all of which have rejected positivistic 
science and posit that there are no facts, only interpretations.4 According 
to Vattimo, the notion that »each experience of truth is an experience of 
interpretation is almost a truism in today’s culture«.5 For him, »Herme-
neutics is not only a theory of the historicity (horizons) of truth; it is itself 
————
2  I define the »bourgeois uncanny« as the moment when one recognizes that his or 
her individuality is a collectively held and historically determined notion. Hence the 
uncanny feeling that one’s subjectivity is both one’s own and part of a collective narra-
tive.
3  VATTIMO: 1997.
4  Vattimo discusses Habermas’ theory of communication, Derrida’s deconstruction, 
the late Heidegger, Rorty’s philosophy of contingency, and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. He 
posits the commonality of a weakened truth claim for each of these theories. 
5  VATTIMO: 1997, 5.
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a radically historical truth«.6 Hermeneutics, then, is a theory that for-
wards a truth claim that is contingent upon its historical moment. In 
other words, any hermeneutic theory lacks a foundation, as the interpre-
tation it presents is conditioned by the historical environment in which 
the interpreting subject resides. It follows that hermeneutics is a way of 
thinking that factors in contemporaneity, and hence the hermeneutic 
circle in all its self-referentiality is born.7
 This hermeneutic self-referentiality entails that the interpreter’s view 
of history is dependent on his self-perception as a subject in the contem-
porary historical environment he or she describes. The negotiation be-
tween the historical past and the understanding of the interpreter in his 
interpreting moment depends upon the assumption that the horizon of 
the past constitutes a part of the horizon of the present. The past, history 
as culture, has been internalized by the interpreting subject and recon-
structed in dialectic of self-identification. This dialectic of self-identity is 
interpretative, as the interpreter needs to consider the historical locus of 
his own subjectivity in order to posit himself as interpreter. This process 
animates the past within the horizon of understanding in the present. The 
interpreting subject is not limited to an adherence to the past, however, 
as he makes the past contemporary through the process of reconstruc-
tion, which is in a necessary relationship to his construction of self as a 
historical subject. For inherent in this reconstruction of the past is a con-
struction of the self as interpreter in the moment. We have already dis-
cussed how this works for Strindberg and Nietzsche in the fifth and sixth 
chapters of this book. 
 Vattimo claims that the radical historicity of the hermeneutic process 
results in the weakening of any claim to truth. This weakening has theo-
logical implications, which in turn, have an effect on the interpreter’s 
understanding of the genesis of his own subjectivity. Vattimo asserts that 
the most illuminating example »for an argument of this kind is 
Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God«.8 Vattimo does not read 
Nietzsche’s »announcement« in a metaphysical sense. He argues 
————
6  Ibid., 6.
7  This self-referentiality of Vattimo’s conception of the hermeneutic circle is certainly 
not the only understanding present in our intellectual environment. I am using Vattimo 
as an example of just one trajectory of thought in order to illustrate an aspect of the 
Nietzschean legacy in our times. 
8  VATTIMO: 1997, 5.
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»Nietzsche is not trying to say that God is dead because we have finally 
realized that ›objectively‹ he does not exist or that reality is such that he 
is excluded from it.«9 Vattimo understands Nietzsche’s statement as a 
postulation about the possibilities of interpretation in his philosophi-
cal/historical moment. These possibilities for »truth« exclude any reli-
ance on the foundation of a first philosophy and
draw us closer to the theme of nihilism. If hermeneutics, as the philosophical 
theory of the interpretative character of every experience of truth, is lucid 
about itself, as no more than an interpretation, will it not find itself caught up 
in the nihilistic logic of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics. This ›logic‹ may be encapsu-
lated in the statement that there can be no recognition of the essentially inter-
pretative character of the experience of the true without the death of god and 
without the fabling of the world, or which amounts to the same thing, of being. 
In short, it seems impossible to prove the truth of hermeneutics other than pre-
senting it as a response of the history of being interpreted as the occurrence of 
nihilism.10
The experience of truth exemplified by Nietzsche’s announcement of the 
»death of God« goes hand in hand with the »fabling of being,« the crea-
tion of the self as narrative. Vattimo’s claim can be seen in the light of 
Max Weber’s postulation that modernity occurs in a world abandoned by 
the Gods, that is to say, a disenchanted world, and Nietzsche’s notion of 
the fabling of being can be understood as an attempt to re-enchant this 
world through the construction of a self who is aware of the metaphorical 
status of its own narrative. Relative to my own claim that hermeneutics 
demands the construction of an interpreting subject who is aware of the 
historicity of his self-construction, this self-construction needs to factor in 
an absence of guarantee of a divine origin, and consequently be aware of 
the interpretative quality of his own notion of self-hood. The construction 
of a self who both interprets and is created by self-interpretation depends 
on a re-enchantment of the world where the self is substituted for the 
divine. This self-understanding entails a positioning of the subject in a 
secular notion of his own history. The self, in turn, is not a foundation, 
but a play of forces subject to interpretation in the moment. 
 Following this line of thought and adhering to a critical trajectory 
exemplified in the work of Karl Löwith and notably opposed by Hans 
Blumenberg, Vattimo asserts that modernity itself is a secularization of 
————
9  Ibid., 6.
10  Ibid., 7.
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the eschatological impulse of Western religious thought.11 It is in this way 
that Vattimo traces the pre-history of modern hermeneutics to its original 
function as biblical exegesis and justifies the break between hermeneutics 
as bible-study and modern hermeneutics as a general theory of interpreta-
tion.
In other words, modern hermeneutics is born in Europe not only because here 
is a religion of the book that focuses attention on the phenomenon of interpre-
tation, but also because this religion has as its base the idea of the incarnation 
of God, which it conceives as kenosis, as abasement and, in our translation, as 
weakening.12
Vattimo goes on to assert that despite the initial religious impetus of her-
meneutic inquiry, aesthetic and historical experiences have replaced bib-
lical exegesis as the dominant concerns. Vattimo thereby connects 
modern hermeneutic philosophy with an aesthetic modernism in revolt 
against both the natural sciences and religious dogmatism. By employing 
secularization theory and tracing modern hermeneutics to its primal 
scene in section 108 of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science)
Vattimo locates the origins of what he claims to be the dominant way of 
thinking in our time in the late nineteenth century.13 For him, the herme-
neutic aspects of a species of modern historical thinking must factor in 
self-consciousness about the reconstructive process of historical thought 
itself. This present-tense aspect of the historical enterprise was born in 
the rejection of both a divine history and positivistic historiography. 
 And so the question, »are Nietzsche and Strindberg our contemporar-
ies?« has a bearing on my preliminary thesis: An aspect of the legacy of 
the Nietzschean project can be found in Vattimo’s assertion that her-
meneutic inquiry dominates an arc of contemporary western thought. I
will take this one step further. Hermeneutic inquiry itself is a negotiation 
between the construction of different temporal horizons of understanding 
based on a historicized construction of a self that understands itself to be 
located within a stream of constant change and created in the absence of 
————
11  See LÖWITH: 1949 and BLUMENBERG: 1983.
12  VATTIMO: 1997, 48.
13  See NIETZSCHE: 1988c, KSA 3. Section 108 can be found in the third book on pg. 
467 of this edition. It reads: »Neue Kämpfe. – Nachdem Budda todt war, zeigt man noch 
Jahrhunderte lang seinen Schatten in einer Höhle, – einen ungeheuren schauerlichen 
Schatten. Gott is todt; aber so wie die Art der Menschen ist, wird es vielleicht noch 
Jahrtausende lang Höhlen geben, in denen man seinen Schatten zeigt. – und wir – wir 
müssen auch seinen Schatten siegen!« 
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a divine foundation. This postulation leads to another question: If the 
philosophical environment of modernity is constrained by hermeneutics 
in its »nihilistic« moment, what is the status of the subject in the absence 
of a valid claim of a foundation? In other words, how does the subject 
create itself in the absence of a creator? 
Ecce Homo and the Substitution of Self for Christ
With this in mind, I will now turn to an analysis of our texts: Nietzsche’s 
Ecce Homo and Strindberg’s Inferno. This analysis provides us with the 
opportunity to develop further the concept of the genealogy of self and to 
illustrate how Vattimo’s understanding of Nietzsche’s »announcement of 
the ›death of God‹« posits a subject in a process of aesthetic self-
generation whether or not said subject seeks religious salvation. These 
two tasks are intimately connected and together illustrate one theoretical 
conception of the predicament of self-assertion. An understanding of 
aesthetics as an intersubjective embodiment informs my utilization of 
these two seemingly contradictory texts to test the hypothesis that the 
commonality found in Strindberg’s and Nietzsche’s projects is the confla-
tion of autobiography and history in a hermeneutic process of self-
construction. The genealogy of self is a hermeneutic device for the recon-
struction of the subject in that it factors in the contemporaneity, regards 
the past as a text to be interpreted, and has a truth claim that is weakened 
by the absence of »God, the father«. I employ the term as a sub-category 
of and in opposition to the notion of autobiography understood as an 
excavation of the past. A genealogy of self is a performative overcoming 
of origins in the moment. Unlike autobiography, it lacks a telos. There is 
little sense of »I was, so now I must be«. Instead, the genealogy of self
self-consciously highlights the »fictionality« of the past through the em-
ployment of a metaphorical complex made up of agnostic elements. It 
emphasizes the struggle between contradictory forces: between heredity 
and self-creation, and between an internalized social order and individual 
experience. The genealogy of self is an attempt to re-enchant the world 
through a »fabling of being,« but the performer of this process is ironi-
cally aware of the fictional process of self-construction. It is an affect of 
the phenomenon that Vattimo connects to hermeneutics through his 
reading of Nietzsche’s announcement of the »death of God,« and what I 
call the bourgeois uncanny. 
CONCLUSION 261
 On the surface, Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo is an attack on Christianity, 
while Strindberg’s Inferno is most often regarded as a document of reli-
gious conversion. This discrepancy in the reception of the two texts is a 
formidable test for any hypothesis that is concerned with establishing 
their commonality. Ecce Homo is a problematic text. Published posthu-
mously, it is often read either as a sad and puzzling document that points 
to Nietzsche’s imminent mental collapse or as a beautifully written but 
curiously flawed autobiography. If one were to read Ecce Homo as an 
autobiography, he or she would be left with Nietzsche’s hyperbolic 
claims, little information about the philosopher’s life, some self-critique, 
and a series of paradoxical statements. Read as autobiography, the title 
smacks of hubris, and the last line can be understood as a simple restate-
ment of Nietzsche’s opposition to Christianity. But if one reads the text as 
a genealogy of self, as a performative hermeneutic construction, this 
picture changes shape. In order to illustrate this claim, I will analyze 
three points of entry to this text: the title, the last line, and a riddle. 
 The title reads: Ecce Homo. Wie man wird, was man ist. (Ecce 
Homo. How one becomes, what one is.)14 This two-part title provides us 
with a point of entry. The first part: »Ecce Homo« is a biblical citation. It 
appears in John 19:5 and can be translated as behold the man or here is 
the man. The phrase comes from the story of the Passion and is uttered 
by Pilate. The context is as follows: Jesus has been beaten and given a 
crown of thorns to wear. He is »arrayed in a purple robe« and is pre-
sented to the people. Pilate shows Jesus to the crowd and proclaims that 
he finds »no crime in him,« but the priests cry out for his crucifixion. 
After a short discussion, in which Jesus is accused of the crime of misrep-
resenting himself as »the son of God« and condemned to death, he be-
gins his walk to Golgotha.15 In John, the phrase, Ecce Homo, signifies 
————
14  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, 255.
15 The Holy Bible: containing the Old and New Testaments, Revised Standard 
Edition (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952), 854: »Pilate went out again, and 
said to them, ›Behold I am bringing him out to you that you may know that I find no 
crime in him.‹ So Jesus came out, wearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe. 
Pilate said to them, ›Here is the man!‹ [Ecce Homo]. When the chief priests and the 
officers saw him, they cried out, ›Crucify him, crucify him!’ Pilate said to them, ›Take 
him yourselves for I see no crime in him‹ The Jews answered him, ›We have a law, and 
by that law he ought to die, because he has made himself the Son of God.‹« (my empha-
sis)
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Pilate’s presentation of Christ for judgment, and the subsequent narrative 
irony.
 The irony of this narrative moment can be explained by the status of 
the Bible as a central text and Nietzsche’s utilization of the citation. The 
biblical narrative is written with an audience of believers in mind. Chris-
tians believe already that Jesus is the »son of God« and so his presenta-
tion to the crowd by Pilate is a moment of misrecognition: his crime is the 
claim to be the »son of God« and for that he is crucified. Yet, the cruci-
fixion and the subsequent resurrection are the keys to this narrative of 
Christ’s »divinity«. The irony of the story of the Passion becomes appar-
ent: Jesus needs to be misrecognized in order to attain his preordained 
status. Nietzsche isolates this moment of Jesus’ misrecognition and con-
demnation by the priests for reasons that are congruent to his project. 
There are four levels to note. On the first level the use of this citation as a 
title was a continuation of his critique of Christianity, of what he regards 
to have been the »victory of Judea over Rome« and the establishment of 
the values of ressentiment. On the second level, by entitling his own 
story with the phrase, »Ecce Homo,« Nietzsche was pointing to his own 
misrecognition and the potential attack on his own production by the 
»priests« of the ascetic ideal. On the third level, Nietzsche, who in the 
same book declared »ich bin, auf griechisch, und nicht nur auf 
griechisch, der Antichrist« (I am, in Greek, and not just Greek, the Anti-
Christ),16 was writing himself into the position of Jesus while simultane-
ously declaring himself to be his opposite. This is the key to the irony in 
Ecce Homo. The textual subject that exhorts its reader: »Hört mich! denn 
ich bin der und der. Verwechselt mich vor Allem nicht!« (Listen to me! I 
am the one who I am! Above all, do not mistake me for anyone else!)17
shows himself to be »der und der,« a compound metaphor that is de-
pendent upon misrecognition in order to establish »himself« as a stand-in 
for an extra-textual subjectivity. On the fourth level, he announces him-
self, and by doing so, writes himself temporarily into the position of Pilate 
by enunciating »Ecce Homo« thereby intimating that the performative act 
of saying »who you are« entails the announcement of an internalized 
collision where one is neither Pilate nor Jesus, as one oscillates between 
the position of announcing and being delivered to the public. For 
————
16  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, 302. Translation NORMAN: 2005, 102.
17  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, 257. Translation: NORMAN: 2005, 71.
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Nietzsche, one becomes a subject as he speaks, wandering into the col-
lective poetics of the »I,« entering into a tragic discourse, where the mo-
ment of emergence is also fraught with danger. 
 The subtitle of the book reads: Wie man wird, was man ist. (How 
one becomes, what one is.)18 Given Nietzsche’s position that life is eter-
nal becoming, and as echoed in his statement that Dionysian philosophy 
found its bearings in »das Jasagen zu Gegensatz und Krieg, das Werden,
mit radikaler Ablehnung auch selbst des Begriffs ›sein‹« (saying yes to 
opposition and war, becoming along with a radical rejection of the very 
concept of ›being‹),19 if we factor in his objection to the concept of being, 
it is not hard to imagine that the comma in this statement is significant. 
The punctuation in the sentence – »Wie man wird, was man ist« – juxta-
poses the two concepts of becoming and being, thereby emphasizing the 
process and movement between the two terms. 
 A parallel is established by the title and the subtitle. The reference is 
clear: Christ becomes who he is by walking the road to Golgotha. What 
awaits him at the end of his journey is the crucifixion that establishes his 
identity. Nietzsche entitles his genealogy of self so as to write himself 
ironically into the position of Christ and into the position of the one who 
announces the demise of Christ and therefore his salvation. This is cer-
tainly both a biblical parody and the performance of a tragedy, as 
Nietzsche describes himself through the moment of his own untergang
(down-going). The textual journey leads to the last line which reads: »Hat 
man mich verstanden? – Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten …« (Have I 
been understood? – Dionysus versus the crucified …)20
 While this line certainly can be read as an expression of Nietzsche’s 
approaching madness, as a megalomaniac proclamation of opposition to 
the moral order of the Christian world by a man who considered himself 
to be a destiny, my own reading is different. It factors in the irony inher-
ent in Ecce Homo and sees the text as a performative process in which 
oppositions are ranked and ordered to produce a compound metaphor of 
self. I understand the last line to mean that Nietzsche has written himself 
into both positions, he is recurrent through tragic de-indivduation and 
through crucifixion. »Nietzsche« is »ein Jünger des Philosophen Diony-
————
18  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, Title page for Ecce Homo, 256.
19  Ibid., 313. The English translation is from NORMAN: 2005, 110.
20  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, 374. English translation: NORMAN: 2005, 151.
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sos« (a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus)21 and he is the Antichrist. 
He is both »ein decadent« (a decadent) and he is »auch dessen Gegen-
satz« (also its opposite).22 The story of the self is a story of a process of 
becoming and the self is represented by the internalization of both posi-
tions. The re-enchantment of the self in a world where »God is dead« is 
performed by the writing of the self into the position of both the dead 
God and that which is to replace him. However, this claim of the dual 
origination of the metaphor »Nietzsche« demands further elaboration. 
Das Glück meines Daseins, seine Einzigkeit vielleicht, liegt in seinem Ver-
hängnis: ich bin, um es in Räthselform auszudrücken, als mein Vater bereits 
gestorben, als meine Mutter lebe ich noch und werde alt. Diese doppelte Her-
kunft, gleichsam aus der obersten und der untersten Sprosse an der Leiter des 
Lebens, décadent zugleich und Anfang …
(The happiness of my existence, perhaps its uniqueness, lies in its fatefulness; 
to give it in the form of a riddle: as my father I am already dead and as my 
mother I am still alive and growing old. This double birth, from the highest and 
lowest rungs on the ladder of life, as it were, simultaneously decadent and be-
ginning …)23
The chapter, »Warum ich so weise bin« (Why I am so wise), continues to 
describe this doubleness as a condition of being both a decadent and its 
opposite. »Nietzsche« claims that this dual origin is a source of his 
unique perspective, and it acts as his »Stimulans zu Leben« (Stimulation 
to Life).24 In his ensuing description of the healthy individual, which for 
Nietzsche was the opposite of a decadent, he states, »er ist ein auswäh-
lendes Princip, er lässt viel durchfallen« (he is a selective principle, it lets 
much fall by the wayside).25 This principle of selection implies that the 
healthy individual is a locus of interpretation where competing princi-
ples, internalized elements of his own inheritance, are transformed by the 
experience of interpretation. This transformation is the process of self-
creation. For if one is both a decadent and a healthy individual, both 
alive and dead, and subject to the absence of a stable foundation for the 
————
21  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, 258. The English is from NORMAN: 2005, 71.
22  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, 266. Also see my earlier discussion of this passage in Chapter 5.
23  Ibid., 264. Translation NORMAN: 2005, 74–75. A comment on the translation – 
Nietzsche uses the word »Herkunft,« which Norman translates as birth. I would like to 
emphasize the word in the sense that it also designates an origin, in the many senses of 
the word. 
24  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, 267.
25  Ibid. See also my discussion of this selection process in Chapter 5.
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understanding of self-hood, how does one overcome the unhealthy ele-
ments that have been internalized? »Nietzsche« answers: »Wohlan, ich 
bin das Gegenstück eines décadent: denn ich beschrieb eben mich.«
(Well then, I am the opposite of a decadent: because I have just de-
scribed myself.)26
 In Ecce Homo, the self is constructed through agon and a self-
affirmative narrative, through a hermeneutic economy of self-
referentiality and internalized historical conditions. The »death of God« 
acts as a springboard for the construction of an identity whose creation is 
initiated by a substitution of the self for the absent God. The nihilistic self 
overcomes the vacuum of self-creation ex-nihilo by interpreting the text 
of the past in a way that makes it contemporary. This is a gesture of the 
eternal return in which »I was« is interpreted as »I will it to be such«. 
And so the old gods are brought back to life as a conglomeration. Diony-
sus and Christ merge to form a compound metaphor for the hermeneuti-
cally constructed self, aware of his own metaphorical status. This 
metaphorical status derives from a textual journey, a narrative. 
 In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche created a self in response to his conception 
of Western history as the advent of nihilism. This self-construction is a 
hermeneutic process in that it is contingent upon the internalization of its 
historical moment, its »truth« is expressed metaphorically as a merger of 
opposing forces organized internally within the horizon of the present, 
and the past is treated, not as fact, but as text subject to an interpretative 
process. The inter-textuality of Nietzsche’s self-construction was so radi-
cal, that he commented upon his entire body of work. Ecce Homo is not 
an autobiography, it is a genealogy of self, a performance of a hermeneu-
tic self-interpretation of a textualized past regulated by differentiated 
repetition. It seems to be that Nietzsche’s conception of the »death of 
God« is a tragic conception, one born of collision. It is also clear from 
that collision that the »death of God« is not a statement of finality, but an 
existential gesture, a pausing before decision. For Nietzsche does not 
eradicate the presence of Christ (his culture’s God), but shows the subject 
to be an amalgam that includes his internalized narrative. As I stated in 
my introduction, Nietzsche interpreted himself as being born posthu-
mously as his dead father. 
————
26  Ibid., 267. English translation from NORMAN: 2005, 77.
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 My preliminary thesis stated that the answer to the question of 
whether Strindberg and Nietzsche were our contemporaries lies in how 
the subject creates itself in a disenchanted world. Following Vattimo’s 
line of thinking about the meaning and the impact of Nietzsche’s »an-
nouncement of the death of God« and extending it to the realm of iden-
tity formation, I claimed that if the experience of truth is to be satisfied 
with an interpretation, then the self, lacking a foundation displaces the 
notion of a divine narrative with the genealogy of its own construction. 
This genealogy is a gesture, as it states two originary positions in opposi-
tion and pauses before the decision of being one or the other. 
Inferno and the Split between Love and Knowledge 
Strindberg wrote Inferno in Lund between May 3 and June 25 of 1897.
Originally written in French, the manuscript was translated into Swedish 
by Eugène Fahlstedt and first appeared in November of the same year. It 
was also published in France by the publishing house, Mercure de 
France, in 1898. Inferno tells the story of Strindberg’s last residence in 
Paris, his separation from his second wife, Frida Uhl, and his journey 
back to Sweden through Austria. In the 1909 preface to Tjänstekvinnans
son IV, Strindberg dated the book in 1898, and grouped it with Legender
and the play Advent both dated 1899. He remarked:
Stora krisen vid 50 år; revolutioner i själslivet, ökenvandringar, ödeläggelsen, 
Swedenborgs Helveten och Himlar. Icke influerad av Huysmans’ En Route, 
ännu mindre av Pèladan, som då var Förf.okänd, liksom ‹‹ En Route ››, utan 
byggd på personliga upplevelser. 
(The great crisis as I turn 50; revolutions in my spiritual life, wanderings in the 
desert, devastation, Swedenborg’s hell and heaven. Not influenced by Huys-
man’s En Route, even less so by Pèladan, who was then not known by the au-
thor, similar to En Route, except built on personal experiences.)27
In Levande död: Studier i Strindbergs prosa, Ulf Olsson devotes a chap-
ter to Inferno, which he dubs »Det redan skrivnas text« (The Already 
Written Text).28 Olsson claims that Inferno operates on both an allegori-
cal and realist level of narration. This results in a tension between the 
already written texts of religious conversion and the historically bound 
————
27  STRINDBERG: 1996a, 266. Translation mine. 
28  OLSSON: 1996. The chapter on Inferno, »The Already Written Text,« can be found 
on pp. 305–394.
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bourgeois notion of subjectivity. For Olsson, this results in the depiction 
of a struggle between meaning and the vacuum, and in Strindberg’s as-
sumption of the positions of both Christ and Antichrist. Though Olsson 
posits that the ideology of Inferno is informed by Nietzsche’s Wied-
erkunft des Gleichen (Eternal Return of the Same), he does not elaborate 
fully on this claim. However, the notion of a substitution of the self for 
both Christ and Antichrist provides us with a point of entry from which 
to explore the commonality between Inferno and Ecce Homo. Olsson’s 
notion of »The Already Written Text« allows us to interrogate the herme-
neutic aspects of the former. The struggle between the bourgeois and 
religious notions of selfhood leads to analysis between the split between 
love and knowledge that culminates in a mise-en-abyme in which these 
two forces merge. I will address each of these points in turn. 
 Despite its religious overtones, Inferno, like Ecce Homo, is a response 
to the »death of God«. Like »Nietzsche,« the narrating »Strindberg« con-
structs a subjectivity in response to his understanding of this cultural/his-
torical phenomenon. Despite the presence of »the powers,« 29  the 
construction of self in the text is a process of negotiation between the 
antagonism of already existing positions, and the overcoming of this an-
tagonism through a creation of the self as a compound metaphor.30 These 
already existing positions are recreated through interpretation. The 
»powers« act upon the narrator in an economy of internal and external 
signification; there is never any indication of a self that is solely created 
by external forces. The self is a site of interpretation. Self-knowledge, the 
»fabling of being,« is derived through an interpretation of signs in an 
occult manner. The »powers« do not provide a foundation for the con-
struction of the self; in a sense they act as a personification of Nietzsche’s 
organizing idea, providing a type of grammar for the random interpreta-
tion of signs in the absence of any correspondence between an absolute 
truth and experience. Like »Nietzsche,« the narrator of Inferno, despite 
his religious pilgrimage, does not enact an imitation of Christ, but rather 
performs the substitution of self for Christ in an attempt to re-enchant a 
————
29  Strindberg used the term »d’ordre des puissances« in French which was translated 
by Fahlstedt as »makterna« in Swedish. These terms were used to describe invisible 
forces that watched and reacted to »Strindberg’s« daily life.
30  This process has already been discussed in chapter 6. Strindberg employed this 
technique as early as 1885 in the writing of Tjänstekvinnans son. The salient example is 
Johan’s dual inheritance. 
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disenchanted world. The narrator’s substitution of self for Christ factors 
in the position of the Antichrist. Like »Nietzsche’s« conception of the 
decadent and its antithesis, this is a compound metaphor for a fluid sub-
jectivity.
Jag stannar hänryckt inför den symboliska synen men då jag vänder blicken 
därifrån varseblir jag till höger om mig en skylt till ett färgeri vid rue de 
Fleurus. Sannerligen! visionens verklighet är oförneklig. Målade på butiks-
fönstret finner jag initialer till mitt namn: A.S. svävande på ett silvervitt moln 
och därovan en regnbåge. Omen accipio och jag påminner mig ett ställe i 
Genesis: »Jag skall sätta min båge i skyn och den skall vara tecknet till för-
bundet mellan mig och jorden.« 
(I stand enraptured before that symbolic sight, but when I turn my gaze from it 
I perceive to my right a paint store’s sign on rue de Fleurus. Truly! the vision’s 
reality is undeniable. I find my initials, A.S., painted on the store’s window, 
hovering on a silver-white cloud and above that is a rainbow. Omen accipio
and I remind myself of a passage in Genesis: »I shall place my rainbow in a 
cloud and that shall be a sign of the pact between myself and the earth.«) 31
There is a distinct hermeneutic economy in the text. The world, as text, is 
interpreted, and internal states are reflected by and projected upon the 
world. Everything speaks to and of the narrating self. 
 In Inferno, the contingency of this process is emphasized. The narra-
tor opens books at random, his chance encounters in the world display 
internal conditions, and his own past is re-interpreted in order to gener-
ate a narrative of self-selection. The radicality of this interpretative proc-
ess, which treats all experience as a text, exemplifies the relationship 
between the accidental self and necessity.32 This explains the two levels of 
reading in Inferno. The process of interpretation conflates the internal 
and external worlds, and is shown to be an arbitrary process, yet at the 
same time, this conflation is intrinsic to the creation of the narrator’s 
subjectivity. A good example of how this works comes on page 61 when 
the narrating »Strindberg« receives his publisher’s corrections of his 
————
31  STRINDBERG: 1994, 35. English translation from SANDBACH: 1988, 116.
32  The exploration of the seemingly contradictory notions of chance and necessity is 
anther point of commonality in Nietzsche and Strindberg’s work. With regard to the 
Nietzschean corpus, one only has to think of his valorization of the random lawlessness 
of the world and his notion of Amor fati. In Strindberg’s authorship, the best example is 
here in Inferno: the relationship between the necessity exemplified by the »powers« and 
the radical contingency of the interpretation of occulted signs performed by the narrator.
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scientific exploration, Sylva Sylvarium.33 The pages are found to be dis-
ordered and the disorder is interpreted. The attempt to order the world 
through a scientific explanation is negated by chance, upon return; the 
disorder is re-interpreted as a sign that is a part of a process of the con-
struction of a new self through narrative. There is no sense of causality to 
this process, there is only a constant process of the order, disorder, and 
re-ordering of chance events. 
 There are many examples in Inferno that illustrate how Strindberg 
employs the external world as a series of signs interpreted according to 
internal imperatives. Street signs, burning coal, initials on a store win-
dow, the configuration of twigs on the ground, all reveal the narrator to 
himself. The relationship between the radical arbitrariness of interpreta-
tion and the necessity represented by the »powers« emphasizes the strug-
gles that accompany the hermeneutic experience of truth as the »fabling 
of being« confronts the nihilistic moment of modernity. It is here in In-
ferno that the self-referentiality of the hermeneutic interpreter seemingly 
attains its most extreme level of irrationality. If we remember, however, 
that hermeneutics posits a radically historical experience of truth; this 
seeming irrationality becomes a startlingly clear example of how the ge-
nealogy of self is a location that highlights the conflation of the irrational 
and rational impulses, which are used in the creation of the self. »Strind-
berg« reads the contingency of signs against the backdrop of the necessity 
of the »powers«. The inexplicable randomness of the world is internal-
ized and organized according to the historically conditioned imperative 
of self-creation. »Autobiographical« narrative and historical conditions 
conflate and separate in an ironic ebb and flow where the historical is set 
against the foreground of an occulted existence. This process is herme-
neutic, that is to say, interpretative, and the narrator is aware of his own 
historicity. In other words, what is highlighted in Inferno is the confla-
tion of autobiography and history. I will now turn to a mise-en-abyme to 
illustrate this claim. 
Utan bestämd avsikt kommer jag till Gare Montparnasse och tar tåget till 
Meudon. Jag stiger av vid själva byn som jag besöker för första gången. Går 
uppför stora gatan, viker av åt höger i en gränd som är omgiven av två murar. 
Tjugo steg framför mig höjer sig över marken en romersk krigare i järngrå 
rustning till hälften nedgrävd i jorden. Ehuru figuren är mycket tydligt ut-
————
33  STRINDBERG: 1994, 61. Sylva Syvarium is a »scientific« exploration written by 
STRINDBERG in 1895.
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formad, men i miniatyr, undgår det mig inte att den är av obearbetad sten. Då 
jag kommit ända fram visar sig föremålet vara en synvilla, men jag hejdar mig 
och fasthåller med flit illusionen som roar mig. 
(Without specific intention, I arrive at Gare Montparnasse and take the train to 
Meudon. I get off at the village itself, which I am visiting for the first time. Go 
up the main street, turn to the right into a lane that is surrounded by two walls. 
Twenty steps in front of me, a roman warrior raises himself above the ground. 
He is in iron gray armor, half-way buried in the earth. Although the figure is in 
miniature, it is very clearly formed and it doesn’t escape me that it is of un-
worked stone. When I have finally come forward to it, the object shows itself 
to be an optical illusion, but I stop myself and maintain industriously the illu-
sion that amuses me.)34
»Strindberg« travels randomly to Meudon. He sees a stone in the road 
and imagines it to be a roman warrior. He is not concerned with its real-
ity, but persists in his illusion. Treatment of this episode demands a re-
turn to the theme of the opposition of love and knowledge, with which 
the book had opened. On the level of realist narration, the text opens 
with the narrator sending away his wife and rejoicing about his decision. 
By the end of the page, there is a dark sense of foreboding. »Ställd i valet 
mellan kärlek och vetandet hade jag bestämt mig för att söka nå kun-
skapens höjder, och i det jag försakade mina känslor glömde jag den 
oskyldiga som offrats på altaret för min ärelystnad, eller min kallelse.« 
(Forced to choose between love and knowledge, I had decided to seek 
the heights of the intellectual achievement, and in renouncing my feelings 
I forgot the innocent who would be sacrificed for my ambition, or my 
calling.)35 The theme of the opposition continues to appear throughout 
the narrative, manifesting in the narrator’s interpretation of external 
events and his attribution of the seeming randomness of the universe of 
signs to the incomprehensible plans of the »powers«. 
 By the time he journeys to Meudon, »Strindberg« is convinced that 
his choice of knowledge over love is absolute, excluding the possibility of 
love itself. Then he sees the »illusion« of the knight. He persists in his 
vision and describes it in detail. The gaze of the knight peers at an in-
scription on one of the surrounding walls. The narrator’s eyes follow and 
he sees that the letters F and S are written in charcoal. He interprets these 
letters as the inscription of his own initials and those of his wife. He ex-
————
34  STRINDBERG: 1994, 69. Translation mine. 
35  Ibid., 9. Translation mine. 
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claims, »Hon älskar mig fortfarande!« (She still loves me!)36 In the next 
moment, this illusion transforms and the letters read FE and S, the signs 
for iron and sulfur, the alchemical ingredients for the manufacture of 
gold. He then finds two lead stamps on the ground, one that is inscribed 
with the royal crown. Love, knowledge, and sovereignty merge in an 
illusion, to which the gaze of a historical figure directed the narrator. The 
agonistic elements of a self in turmoil are united in his interpretation of 
signs in the context of his imaginings that re-construct the idea of a his-
torical figure. Symbolically, history conflates with the construction of the 
compound metaphor of self, the representation of which is the result of 
the internalization of a personal and a cultural history. The opposition 
between love and knowledge is overcome in a metaphorical union com-
prised of both elements. In this scene, the economy of self-representation 
in Inferno reveals itself to be a genealogy of self as the »fabling of being« 
connects to history. This self-construction, aware of its status as an illu-
sory representation conflates the interpreting self and that which is inter-
preted through a negotiation between the necessity of self-creation and 
the contingency of experience. In Inferno as well as in Ecce Homo, the 
»truth« of the self is hermeneutic. 
The Significance of Recurrence 
Now I will return momentarily to the question proposed by the title of 
this conclusion: Are Nietzsche and Strindberg our contemporaries? Ac-
cording to Vattimo, the philosophical possibilities for the late twentieth-
century were limited by a hermeneutic imperative where truth is experi-
enced as interpretation. The primal scene of this truth is Nietzsche’s »an-
nouncement of the death of God«. The question is whether this late 
twentieth century formulation speaks to those of us now living just be-
yond its cusp. 
 In their genealogies of self, Nietzsche and Strindberg initiated a con-
struction of subjectivity by substituting the self for the divine. The lack of 
a divine guarantee is internalized and transformed into a principle of 
psychological necessity. This necessity is then negotiated through the 
contingency of narrative as this absence is made manifest through lan-
guage. The origination of the self is posited to be inaccessible; it is merely 
————
36  Ibid. Translation mine. 
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contingently negotiated through an agonistic process that obeys the struc-
tural imperative of giving a name to the unnamable. In many ways this 
process, the substitution of the symbolic for the real anticipates psycho-
analysis. For many the trajectory of thought that runs through the work 
of Nietzsche and Strindberg moves forward in an arc through the Freu-
dian notion of the attainment of mental health through narrative and the 
inaccessibility of the real. This process is dependent upon the hidden 
connections between associations and is, in essence, a hermeneutic proc-
ess. For both Strindberg and Nietzsche, the hermeneutic of self-formation 
was dependent upon an internalization and transformation of external 
imperatives. The location held by the dead God, the dead Father has 
been read by many modernists as the primary psychological signifier, as 
the phallus that produces the very language that names it. As Jacques 
Lacan wrote, »the true formula of atheism is not God is dead […] the true 
formula of atheism is God is unconscious«.37
 However, I would like to propose an alternative. Is the death of God 
truly a linguistic formula; is it a product of our dreams? For Lacan, there 
is a moment where »[d]esire manifests itself in the dream by loss ex-
pressed in an image at the most cruel point of the object«.38 For psycho-
analysis this moment of loss is the moment where language is born as a 
function of the differentiated repetition of symptom. Is it not so, however, 
that we, with the word God, reduce wonder to discourse and repetition 
to symptom? Is this not one of the reasons that the ironic Nietzsche 
chose Ecce Homo as the title of his self-genealogy? For »Ecce Homo« is 
a citation from John, which begins: »In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God.« For if we believe as 
Lacan, the unconscious is structured like language and the truth of athe-
ism resides therein, then perhaps the paramount importance of the struc-
turing authority of the Father in psychoanalysis can be explained by this 
as well. This certainly raises the question of whether this perspective is 
part of modernity’s misreading of itself as a secular age and the misread-
ing of Nietzsche’s confrontation of Christ with Dionysus as atheism in-
stead of a moment of collision. For modernity is/was, I will avoid this 
tired debate, not simply a secular age, but an age of tragic collisions and 
the internalization of this agon. 
————
37  LACAN: 1981, 59.
38  Ibid. 
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 One could argue further that the equivalence of word and God, and 
God as incarnation revealed through word commits the sin of an onto-
logical fallacy, the collapse of being into text. It repeats the mistake of 
collapsing the doer into the deed, of ignoring the retrospective anticipa-
tion of Hinzudichtung, of poeticization. It is as if Nietzsche chooses 
John because he wishes to critique the reduction of religion to magic, to a 
form of representation based on an absence that it effaces through illu-
sion. It is a critique of modes of representation that claim a fidelity to 
loss; it is a critique of nihilism. 
 In an environment where the most provocative of thinkers wrote 
about the draining of meaning from institutional forms, the possibility of 
transcendence was annulled in favor of a repetitive process where com-
peting versions of events are negotiated. Perhaps the message inherent in 
the Nietzschean genealogies speaks to the need of seeing the other with-
out ressentiment acting as the regulation force of repetition. It is impor-
tant to remember that when Nietzsche claims to be the philosopher of 
Dionysus, he is asserting the primacy of that which cannot appear with-
out the aegis of that which gives form. It is my claim that Nietzsche’s 
original form-giving principle, the Apollonian, which he paired with the 
Dionysian in Die Geburt der Tragödie (The Birth of Tragedy), has now 
been replaced by the cultural historical aspect that he felt gave form to a 
nihilistic western notion of subjectivity, Christ. Nietzsche’s critique of 
modernity defined religion as its limit, as the conditions of possibility for 
the recurrence whose linguistic affect creates the poetics of subjectivity. 
Strindberg’s notion of recurrence is born within this context also, a con-
text colored by the collision between two forms of return, one born of 
circularity and the other born of anticipation. This is congruent with 
Nietzsche’s notion of a collision of the two Gods who return, Dionysus 
and Christ. This formulation, which Strindberg shares in other words, 
shows us one mode of description of the limits of nihilistic modernity. He 
also shows us something that Nietzsche excludes: that in the realm of the 
quotidian, a sense of nihilistic modernity delimits the possibility for the 
recognition of repetition; and therefore repetition appears in the form of a 
denial, while its architecture is ironically displayed. This manifests as the 
fetish for the new. 
 Let us look at an example. Strindberg’s Till Damaskus 1 (1898) re-tells 
a story told in Inferno, the narrator’s trip to Donau, where he visits his 
daughter and stays with his in-laws. The scene in Inferno begins with the 
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narrator’s departure from Berlin. He had just returned and wants to kill 
off his past, to have his Berlin memories remain »begravet för att lämna 
rum för nytt« (buried in order to leave room for the new).39 He then 
exclaims:
Jag lämnar detta Berlin som blivit mitt andra fädernesland, där jag genomlevat 
min secunda primavera och min sista. På Anhalt-bangården lämnar jag jämte 
minnena varje hopp om att på nytt få uppleva en vår och en kärlek, som aldrig, 
aldrig skall återkomma! 
(This Berlin that I was leaving had been my second fatherland. In it I had lived 
through my seconda primavera, which was also to be my last. At the Anhalter 
Bahnhof I left behind me not only my memories but all hope of renewing a 
springtime and a love that were never, never to return again.)40
Eugéne Fahlstedt’s Swedish translation from Strindberg’s original in 
French does not quite capture the denial of repetition in its utterance as 
the original citation ends with »jamais, jamais,« emphasizing that the 
narrator’s dashed hopes for re-experiencing happiness is enunciated as a 
passionate stammering. 
 The work of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is of some 
importance here and in particular his story of another journey to Berlin 
that ended in a denial of repetition. While Strindberg addresses his coun-
tryman, the 18th-century mystic Emmanuel Swedenborg, more directly in 
this time period, my interest is in depicting the conditions of possibility 
for recurrence in relation to modernity, and suffice it to say for now, 
while Swedenborg enjoyed a particular sense of certainty, was convinced 
that his visions allowed for a direct observation of the spirit world, 
Strindberg was not so sure. I believe that this can be understood when we 
consider that Swedenborg did not understand himself to be living under 
the sign of nihilism while Strindberg did. Kierkegaard, who also believed 
himself to be living in nihilistic times, shows us how this works. 
 Kierkegaard was extremely interested in repetition as an existential 
possibility. His enigmatic text, Gjentagelsen (Repetition) (1843), written 
under the pseudonym Constantin Constantius, leaves us with a rather 
ironic conclusion. While Constantin denies that repetition is possible, his 
own story involves a return to Berlin, which despite all the outward signs 
to the contrary fails to produce the kind of repetition that he seeks, a 
————
39  STRINDBERG: 1994, 189. Translation mine. 
40  Ibid. Translation from SANDBACH: 1988, 203.
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repetition that provokes transcendence. He understands this failure as 
the failure of staging as he arranged scenes and objects but found them to 
be lifeless, which he interpreted as proving that there was no repetition. 
Of course, when we realize that Constantin’s premise is dependent on an 
arbitrary distinction between the predominance of recollection in ancient 
philosophy, and his hope for the ascendance of repetition as a category 
for the modern, we can understand, remembering Mircea Eliade’s work 
on recurrence, that his blindness originates from an inadequate under-
standing of modernity. That is modernity as a discursive moment that 
distinguishes between moments of development and its other. In his The 
Myth of the Eternal Return41 Eliade claims that we must consider that 
there is a distinct difference between the way a traditional society and a 
modern society address the reality of an object. A pre-modern society, he 
argues, acts on the principle that there is a transcendent reality and that 
»the object appears as the receptacle of an exterior force that differenti-
ates it from its milieu and gives it meaning and value«.42 He goes on to 
claim that the meaning of human acts in such a society »is not connected 
with their crude physical datum but with their property of reproducing a 
primordial act, of repeating a mythical example« and that because of this 
dynamic, »life is a ceaseless repetition of gestures initiated by others«. 
However, it is important to remember that Eliade makes his argument 
based on the notion that repetition derives from a belief in what he calls a 
»celestial archetype,« the repetition of a primordial act that resulted in 
the creation of the world. In modernity, in the nineteenth century, repeti-
tion was intimately connected to the creation of a subjective interiority. 
This leads to the question: What is the significance of repetition in a 
world in which notions of creation and transcendence have become in-
ternalized and the external force that bestows meaning upon objects and 
actions is perceived to have exited the stage. Considering that Strindberg, 
post-Inferno, imbues the objects of his world with a strong hermeneutic 
resonance and that he thematizes the notion of regulating spirits, or un-
seen powers by reading random objects in his environment and animat-
ing them with auto-biographical significance, how are we to explain 
Strindberg’s notion of recurrence? 
________
41  ELIADE: 2005.
42  Ibid., 4.
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 It is clear that Strindberg is very aware of living under the sign of 
modernity and that he does not simply attribute transcendental qualities 
to the objects that he interprets, and he is never quite certain about the 
transcendental status of his experience of recurrence. Kierkegaard’s Con-
stantine, as a self-conscious modern, also lived in an environment where 
an exterior force did not animate the objects in his life, and the experi-
ence he had of repetition was not regulated by a re-creation of the world. 
His expectation of transcendence was thwarted by his modernity, his 
concept of repetition delimited by the banality of everyday life. This is 
further indicated by the story of his correspondent, the young man who 
does experience repetition as a paradox, as a loss that returns his self to 
him. Of course when we realize that Constantin created the young man, 
designates him as a »primitive,« and uses him as an example, we realize 
that the text is ironically showing us that the conditions of possibility for 
repetition as a modern category disallow for a certainty about the content 
of recurrence, while assuring us that the desire for repetition is what al-
lows us to commute between the of realm existential actuality and the 
stage architecture that promises an ideal. Repetition is a state of anticipa-
tion in the face of uncertainty. Repetition is also more significantly denied 
on the level of the bourgeois intellectual who is blind to the desire to 
repeat as the exoteric aspect of repetition and even blinder to the oc-
culted significance of the denial of repetition as its confirmation. For 
Kierkegaard, and for Strindberg, this occurs because of their understand-
ing of modernity as an occurrence of nihilism. 
 Kierkegaard’s Literary Review of 1846 describes the present age and 
the emptying of meaning from the social structure and the predominance 
of reflection.43 For Kierkegaard, modernity is the moment of the empty 
gesture, of leveling, reflection, and an inward turn. This inward turn is for 
Kierkegaard where the possibility of religious experience resides. But it is 
important to remember that for Kierkegaard, the religious subject appears 
as the bourgeois subject, his movement towards a repetitive transcen-
dence is opaque, indistinguishable.44 Though for Kierkegaard, the subject 
is the site of collision between the chatter of secularity and its double the 
passion of religious discourse. This thought is further reinforced by a 
————
43  See KIERKEGAARD: 2001.
44  See Kierkegaard: 2006.
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notebook entry from 1854, where Kierkegaard writes about primitivity and 
inwardness.
Primitivity is part of every human being’s constitution, since primitivity is the 
possibility of spirit – God, who has made it so, knows the best. All earthly, 
temporal, worldly wisdom relates to killing one’s primitivity. Christianity re-
lates to following one’s primitivity. 
Kill your primitivity, and in all probability you will get along very nicely in the 
world, perhaps even be a success – but the eternal does not honour you. Fol-
low primitivity and you will be shipwrecked in the temporal, but the eternal 
accepts you.45
In Kierkegaard’s text, Eliade’s notion of archaic discourse remains as an 
internal possibility; the discourse of modernity internalizes the discourse 
of its other. Recurrence becomes a site where the discourse of reflection 
(modernity) collides with the discourse of transcendence (circular recrea-
tion of a religious possibility). This leads to two competing notions that 
collide within the individual. This how the setting of the scene sublates; 
in an attempt to re-animate the nihilistic environment of modernity, the 
desire for repetition is posited and then denied, the dialectic retaining the 
desire for repetition which re-emerges discursively in the form of its de-
nial.
 And so it is for Strindberg on the level of staging, where the denial of 
repetition occurs despite the architecture of recurrence. This denial then 
re-animates the stage, filling it with powers unseen and all knowing, who 
bring up his past to him as a deus ex machina assuring repetition. On the 
level of motif, it is as if Marx’s remark that history occurs twice, the first 
time as tragedy and the second as farce, is internalized and re-staged in a 
private arena of tragedy and parody. In a way, this explains the re-writing 
of the narrator’s trip to Donau as Till Damaskus 1. In Inferno, he de-
scribes this trip as a pilgrimage; in its re-writing in the drama, it takes on 
the form of a parody where the discourse of the other is inhabited, in this 
case Saul as he becomes Paul. Here in the play, the discourse of denial is 
replaced by the Nietzschean thematization of recurrence as the structure 
of a Dionysian theater, where the beginning of the tragedy doubles as the 
beginning of the parody and the protagonist pauses before decision, re-
taining the indeterminacy of eternal recurrence and infinite becoming. 
————
45  KIERKEGAARD: 1996, 603.
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 The play has an architecture consisting of 17 scenes. The first eight are 
divided from the last eight by a scene called the asylum. The staging of 
the last eight scenes repeats the first eight in descending order. There are 
a few alterations to indicate that the repetition is differentiated and the 
characters react differently in each moment of repetition. The middle 
scene is called »The Asylum« and it is here that the motif of madness and 
religiosity merge.46 The play begins and ends on the street corner with the 
main character, The Stranger, paused before a decision. The nature of his 
decision mirrors the play’s architecture as he is trying to decide whether 
or not to attend a church, thus denying his own professed atheism. His 
subjectivity is suspended by his indecision. This lack of resolve reflects 
Strindberg’s ambivalence about the title of the play as well. He was un-
sure whether to name it after an incarnation of the devil or not, but in-
stead chose to name it after the conversion of Saul to Paul. This 
subversion of ontology is a modernist gesture, one in which tragedy is 
accentuated by the colliding discourses of Robert le diable and Saint
Paul, the anti-Christian and the Christian exist side by side, and our 
protagonist who contains them both remains paused before decision at 
the play’s close. The motif of the pilgrimage commutes from Inferno to 
Till Damaskus, where it is a discourse that conflates the religious figure 
of the chosen one with the secular discourse of the madman – both dis-
courses of the individual set apart, the individual as the monstrum, that 
which is to be warned against. This is the Nietzschean motif par excel-
lence. Recurrence occurs as a movement towards parody, to a thematiza-
tion of the collision of religious and secular discourse through the 
colonization of sacred narrative by the drama of bourgeois subjectivity. 
For certainly in Till Damaskus 1, the conversion drama of Paul is pro-
jected upon a family drama about the Stranger, the Lady, and the Mother
(the Stranger’s mother-in-law).
————
46  STRINDBERG: 1991, 13. The Scene arrangement reads: »Akt 1: I Gathörnet/Hos 
Läkaren. Akt 2: Hotellrummet/Vid Havet/På Landsvägen/Vid Hålvägen/I Köket. Akt 3:
I Rosenkammaren/Asylen/Rosenkammaren/Köket. Akt 4: I Hålvägen/Landsvägen/Vid 
Havet/Hotellrummet. Akt 5: Hos Läkaren/Gathörnet.« The English translation comes 
from STRINDBERG: 1986, 389: Act 1: On the Street Corner/At the Doctor’s House. Act 2:
In the Hotel Room/By the Sea/On the Road/In the Ravine/In the Kitchen. Act 3: In the 
Rose Room/In the Asylum/The Rose Room/The Kitchen. Act 4: In the Ravine/On the 
Road/By the Sea/In the Hotal Room. Act 5: At the Doctor’s Home/The Street Corner. 
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 On the level of character, Strindberg’s use of doubling is often ex-
plained by taking recourse to the Erinran (The Recollection) that pref-
aces Ett drömspel (A Dream Play). Usually the dream is read in Freudian 
fashion, with Strindberg’s assertion that this fluidity of character is regu-
lated by a consciousness that »står över alla, det är drömmarens« (stands 
over and above them all, the mind of the dreamer).47 However it is impor-
tant to remember that Strindberg never posited a unity of consciousness 
and that the term medvetande, in Swedish, implies that the reflexive 
knowledge of what we call consciousness is a knowing with an other. 
Our comparison with Inferno further illuminates this aspect when we 
recall that the narrator writes:
Min svärmor och min tant som äro tvillingar och fullkomligt lika varandra, 
Med samma karaktär, smak, och antipatier, betrakta varandra som dubbel-
gångare. När jag talar till den ena i den andras frånvaro, är den frånvarande 
genast inne i vad jag sagt så att jag kan fortsätta mina förtroenden med vem 
som helst av dem utan vidare. Därför gör jag ingen skillnad mellan dem i 
denna berättelse som icke är någon roman med anspråk på stil och litterär 
komposition
(My mother-in law and my aunt who are identical twins, exactly alike in char-
acter, with the same likes and dislikes, so that each appears to be the other’s 
double. If I talked to one of them when the other was not present, the absent 
one always knew what I had said, so that I was able to confide in either with-
out having to repeat myself. I don’t therefore distinguish between them in this 
account, which is not a novel with pretensions to style and literary form.48
Here Strindberg, in a text that he claims embraces reality, denies charac-
ter distinction by relegating it to the realm of fiction. In the staging of this 
event, the character of the mother remains and the character of the aunt 
drops out in favor of the young lady, the wife spoken about but absent in 
Inferno. It is curious that Inferno with its claim to actuality plays out a 
notion of character that is occulted, with the condensation of person to 
attribute. While the play Till Damaskus 1, which allegorizes the trip to 
Donau, plays out this scene on the level of a domestic drama. This inver-
sion is a form of the denial of repetition as it concerns ethical relations. 
Denial again points to an occulted repetition. Perhaps this helps to ex-
plain the repetition of the motif of the death of the primal father as the 
origin for the super-ego, as the regulator of ethical relations in the Freu-
dian version of psychoanalysis. 
————
47  STRINDBERG: 1988, 7. Translation: SPRINCHORN: 1986, 646.
48  STRINDBERG: 1994, 203. The English translation is from SANDBACH: 1988, 210.
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 With this in mind, I will conclude by invoking the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas. Two lines from Paul Celan form an epigraph that sits above the 
opening of Emmanuel Levinas’s essay on Substitution.49 The lines read: 
»Ich bin du, wenn/ich ich bin.« (I am you when I am I.) In a section of 
this essay, Levinas addresses a tradition of ontological depictions, stress-
ing that our bourgeois understanding of subjectivity is blind to the subject 
as affect of recurrence. For Levinas, recurrence creates a consciousness of 
identity that »bears its name as a borrowed name, a pseudonym, a pro-
noun«.50 He claims that recurrence creates »an expulsion of the self out-
side the self as its substitution for the other«. In other words, Levinas 
restates the problem of recurrence as the opportunity afforded by substi-
tution, as the moment where the self sees itself repeated and cannot »stop 
at oneself, but goes to the hither side of oneself«. He continues »Recur-
rence becomes identity in breaking up the limits of identity, breaking up 
the principle of being in me …« In other words, recurrence becomes an 
identifiable repetition at an ontological cost; this is the moment of the 
famous Levinesian dictum that ethics precedes ontology as first philoso-
phy. Levinas understands recurrence to open up the possibility of a no-
tion of the self that subverts an ontology based on an essence, (on an I 
that is purely an I), of a self that resides as the regent of a unified con-
sciousness. Of equal importance, Levinas concludes his essay about re-
currence and substitution by making a theological claim, for him, the 
discourse of the secular subject opens up the possibility of perceiving the 
moment of infinity, what Kierkegaard called the fullness of time, a mo-
ment where the ironic condition of the self is founded by a relationship 
upon which it founders, a moment of collision between modern bour-
geois subjectivity and the possibility of knowing a deity as absolute other. 
 Following Levinas, I would like to suggest that perhaps the ideology 
of recurrence in Strindberg’s late production is as much about the de-
struction of the self and its re-establishment as it is about the conflation 
of the literary and the lived. Perhaps Strindberg’s repetition is truly in 
opposition to both idealistic notions of subjectivity and in contradistinc-
tion to any therapeutic goals retroactively projected upon it. Perhaps, 
Strindberg’s repetitions are less about an anticipation of psychoanalysis, 
and more about the discourse of recurrence before it was delimited to an 
————
49  LEVINAS: 1990, 88–125.
50  Ibid., 96
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affect of a symptom, designated by Freud as the desire to return to the 
inorganic. Repetition cannot be reduced to representation’s fair tribute to 
death, or to absence. 
 From my perspective, the issue at hand is how Nietzsche and Strind-
berg inform us about the repressed element of religious discourse, which 
has re-emerged in our recent history. Perhaps what Strindberg shows us 
is how we have entered a different age, where the repressed element is the 
discourse of secular humanism. For certainly we live in an age where 
politicians mistake their speech for the word of God, and God for the 
word. With this in mind, perhaps, each in the same way and each in their 
own, Nietzsche and Strindberg are our contemporaries, serving us as a 
warning against a notion of representation that mistakes the symbolic for 
the literal. Perhaps our contemporaries on the religious right mistake 
imperialism for progress, and Promethean expansion for the true word. 
